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CURRENT LEGISLATION
supplement the program to raise commodity prices, has launched a
campaign to purchase newly mined gold at prices well above the cus-
tomary one of $20.67 an ounce,29 but the effect of thus devaluating
the dollar has had, at this writing, no marked effect upon farm prices.
Disappointing as the early results may be, the determination and
enterprise of the President and his cabinet continues to sustain the
morale of the vast majority of the farmers. The Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act, though originally a hasty improvisation for a desperate
emergency, represents a wide departure from previous legislation
enacted for farm "relief" both in theory and administration, and may
well be considered an introduction to a new era in the history of
American agriculture.
LEO N BRAUN.
THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT-ITS PERMANENT
FEATURE.-Since the last issue of this periodical (May, 1933), the
most outstanding piece of legislation has been the National Industrial
Recovery Act.' Most of the provisions of this enactment will
undoubtedly prove to be temporary, and with those we are not prima-
rily concerned. We shall endeavor to indicate what permanent guide-
post of new government policy this portentous title, symbolized by
the familiar blue eagle, stands for in the effort of the present admin-
istration to find its way out of the "slough of despond."
The applicability of the National Recovery Act extends to per-
sons, natural or artificial, whose business is in or affecting interstate
or foreign commerce,2 and the Recovery Act of the State of New
York, in its provisions concerning intrastate commerce, 3 pledged its
co-operation to the National Recovery Administration. The grava-
men of this whole legislative structure orients itself from the system
of codes, whether voluntary or involuntary, provided for therein, as
will be shown hereinafter.
The operation of the National Act is excluded, legally, from
dealing with industries purely in intrastate (and in no way in or
will yield $150,000,000; the tax now in effect on tobacco is scheduled to raise
$20,000,000; a similar tax on hogs will go into effect in November and is
expected to produce $348,000,000; a processing tax on corn of 30 cents a pound,
soon to go into effect, will yield from $60,000,000 to $70,000,000. Part of the
hog tax and an additional $40,000,000 will be paid to corn farmers who reduce
planting 20%, on the theory that hog prices will thus be improved, since 42%b
of the nation's corn crop is used as hog feed.
I Radio address by President Roosevelt, Oct. 22, 1933.
148 STAT. -, approved June 16, 1933.
2 Id. tit. 1, §6 (d).
'UNCONSOLIDATED LAWS, 1933, c. 781.
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affecting interstate or foreign) commerce, which refuse to sign the
codes. This refusal on the part of such industries is rendered largely
ineffectual, however, by the provision of the New York State Recov-
ery Act which declares that any such code "shall be the standard of
fair competition for such trade * * * as to transactions intrastate in
character"; 4 by the dread of a consumers' boycott by those who
pledged themselves to purchase only at the sign of the blue eagle; by
the fear of labor trouble such as strikes or walkouts of employes who
have more chance of getting better conditions by dint of collective
bargaining; and, finally, by the hardships of financing their opera-
tions, as contrasted with codified industries which find it easier to get
credit.5
Congress authorized the President to establish administrative,
planning and research agencies for two years, and to delegate any of
his functions to them.6 It is thought that this amounts to an improper
delegation of legislative power by Congress to the President and his
appointees. It is submitted that Congress may avoid any such ques-
tion if it amends this Act by a blanket adoption of the standards of
fair competition as set forth in the various codes already approved,
thereby leaving it to the President, and the administrative agencies
acting under him, to work out the details and to carry on the execution
of the Act.7 The Act makes every infraction of a code a misde-
meanor punishable by a $500 fine for every offense, each day of
violation constituting a separate offense, and prescribes injunctive
relief to be sought by the United States District Attorneys. The
amendment suggested above would seem to avoid the consequences
of the decision in United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., where Con-
gress's failure to prescribe fixed and ascertainable standards of guilt
resulted in the affirmation by the Supreme Court of the United States
of the quashing of the indictment.8
Besides the voluntary codes which Congress has authorized the
President to approve, the President is empowered, after notice and
hearing, to prescribe codes for industries which do not or cannot
work out their own and whose acts are against the prescribed policy
and inimical to public interest.9 The President has the further power,
where abuses in wage and price cutting are found, in order to make a
code effective, after notice and hearing, to announce that no person
may engage in or carry on any business in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce specified in such an announcement without a
license. Such licenses are to be granted for not longer than one year
"Id. §§1, 2.
'To be financed by local mortgage companies which are in turn to be
financed by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Vide current press.
6Supra note 1, tit. 1, §2.
'J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 48 Sup. Ct. 348
(1927).
'255 U. S. 81, 41 Sup. Ct. 298 (1920).9 Supra note 1, tit. 1, §3 (d).
CURRENT LEGISLATION
and may be suspended or revoked, after public notice and hearing,
the order of the President being final, if in accordance with law.' 0
Title 1, Section 5 of the Act provides that while this title is in
effect and for 60 days thereafter any code or agreement approved or
prescribed by the President and "any action complying with the pro-
visions thereof taken during such period shall be exempt from the
provisions of the anti-trust laws of the United States." The
same provision we find in the State Recovery Act." This would
seem to provide for a trial period to test the effect of a qualified
reversal of the anti-trust policy of the United States and of New
York State. This is regarded as of permanent value and of most
momentous significance.
The past fifty years have seen the growth and waning of a great
deterrent movement directed against integrated industrial organiza-
tion. The early common law doctrine against "pre-empting, engross-
ing. regrating, and forestalling" restricted conduct in restraint of
trade in the medieval fairs and markets. Standards of fair competi-
tion grew up after "the overturn of mercantilism and the advent of
the laissez faire doctrine of the physiocrats. After the industrial
revolution, the pressure of cut-throat competition led eventually to the
growth of gentlemen's agreements and pools, which were held
illegal. 12 Next came the trusts, which used absolute ownership and
control and whose methods were in accordance with the common law.
This form of organization looked like a great new discovery, but its
too rapid development brought on a social hysteria and politicians
used it for its unpopularity.13 This resulted in the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act.' 4 The Standard Oil 15 and the North River Sugar Refin-
ing 16 cases declared trusts illegal and ultra vires and in the latter the
surrender of stock to the trust by the individual shareholders was
held corporate action subjecting it to dissolution. So the trust move-
ment collapsed and a new device developed, namely, holding com-
panies, wherein the directors had even less fiduciary responsibilities
than former trustees.
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act condemned as illegal "every con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce among the states and with foreign
countries," and made it a crime to participate therein.' 7 One of the
first cases under it was In re Greene,'8 where it was held that the
mere size achieved by a business through lawful means giving it an
-Ibid. §4 (b).
' Supra note 3.
' Alger v. Thatcher, 19 Pick. 51, 54 (Mass. 1836).
"3 TAFT, ANTI-TRUST LAWS AND THE SUPREME COURT (1914) 2, 5.
126 STAT. 209 (1890) 15 U. S. C. A. §1 (1928).
,221 U. S. 1 (1912).
11 121 N. Y. 582, 24 N. E. 834 (1890).
'Supra note 14.
18 52 Fed. 104 (C. C. S. D. Ohio, 1892).
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incidental monopoly was not within the statute. The American Sugar
Refining case' 9 held that the particular contract there involved was
intrastate and hence the federal courts had no jurisdiction. In the
Northern Securities case,20 the concurring opinion of Justice Brewer
referred to the common law rule of reason.21 This "rule of reason"
was proclaimed by the majority of the Court in the Standard Oil
case 22 and the American Tobacco case. 23  The U. S. Steel Corp.
case 24 declared that a monopoly must be successful or a series of
acts must be prejudicial to society before a combination would be
declared illegal. Thus the plain meaning of the Act was hedged
about and construed away until it merely affected the form of com-
bination, but was powerless to hinder monopolies which produced at
minimum social cost. The recognition of this fact led to the Federal
Trade Commission Act 2 5 and, under the sponsorship of the Commis-
sion, over a hundred trade practice conferences have been held in the
past fifteen years. In spite of the rulings of the Federal Trade
Commission which have been upheld by the Court,26 the mushroom
growth of the holding companies, culminating in the unstable pyra-
mid of the 1929 boom and resulting in the recent collapse, brought
home to the administration that monopoly is necessary and may be
beneficial in the form of trade associations and labor unions under the
rigid control of the government. Thus we see that the suspension of
the anti-trust laws by the National Recovery Act is not a bolt from
the blue in so far as it indicates a change in policy, but is the final
recognition by the present administration of the tinderlying economic
trend of the last half century.
RHEA JOSEPHSON.
EMERGENCY MORTGAGE LEGISLATION.-Out of the land has
come the enormous wealth of this country and in the land has been
invested the greater part of the wealth which the land has produced.
"United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895).
20 193 U. S. 197 (1903).
'Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 61 L. J. Q. B. 295 (1892) A. C. 25.
' Supra note 15.
Id. at 106.
"United States v. United States Steel Co., 251 U. S. 417, 40 Sup. Ct. 293
(1919).
138 STAT. 717 (1914) 15 U. S. C. A. 41, 45, 46 (1928), declaring that
"unfair methods of competition in commerce are declared unlawful," that the
Federal Trade Commission is established, inter alia, for investigation of com-
pliance with anti-trust decrees; for investigation of violation of anti-trust
statutes; and for readjustment of business corporations violating anti-trust
satutes.
Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 40 Sup. Ct. 572
(1920) ; Federal Trade Commission v. Beechnut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441,
42 Sup. Ct. 150 (1922); Federal Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refrigerator
Co., 261 U. S. 463, 43 Sup. Ct. 450 (1923).
